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McCRACKEN, STEMERMAN & HOLSBERRY, LLP Grocery Worker Hazard Pay Ordinances February 2, 2021 Page 3 of 5 of discrimination, and the right to vote. Of course, if this legal argument were correct, then the government could never mandate minimum wages, overtime, rest breaks, or safety protections that “interfered” with a private employer’s contract with its employees to provide something inferior. That has not been the law for nearly 100 years, since the United States Supreme Court upheld New Deal economic legislation and brought an end to the so-called Lochner era of jurisprudence.West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392-93 (1937) (upholding Washington State minimum-wage law over equal protection challenged based on alleged “fundamental right” to freedom of contract). CGA’s attempt to revive a legal theory that has been dead since the 1930s and contradicts decades of intervening Supreme Court and federal court precedent is bizarre and will not succeed. Contracts Clause CGA also argues that laws mandating that it pay an additional premium wage to grocery workers violates the Contracts Clause in the U.S. Constitution. The Contracts Clause provides that “\[n\]o state shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, thereby “restrict\[ing\] the power of States to disrupt contractual arrangements.” Sveen v. Melin, 138 S.Ct. 1815, 1821 (2018). But while this text is “facially absolute,” the Supreme Court has long held that “its prohibition must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the State ‘to safeguard the vital interests of its people.’ ” Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934)). Whether a regulation violates the Contract Clause is governed by a three-step inquiry: “The threshold inquiry is ‘whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.’ ” Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411 (quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 (1978)). If this threshold inquiry is met, the court must inquire whether “the State, in justification, \[has\] a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem.” Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411–12 (citation omitted). Finally, the court must inquire “whether the adjustment of ‘the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the legislation’s adoption.’ ” Id. at 412–13 (quoting United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)). The premium-pay mandated by the Long Beach ordinance does not “substantially impair” any retailer’s employment contracts under the Contracts Clause. Even if the Ordinance impaired grocery stores’ contractual ability to deny their workers hazard pay, any impairment would not be “substantial” in light of the extensive regulation of employee wages that already exist.Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411 (“In determining the extent of the impairment, we are to consider whether the industry the complaining party has entered has been regulated in the past.”). For this reason, courts regularly reject Contracts Clause challenges to economic regulation of the employment relationship. See RUI One, 371 F.3d at 1150 (upholding municipal living-wage ordinance over Contracts Clause challenge); Olson v. California, No. CV1910956DMGRAOX,