Item 21 - Assembly Bill 937 (the “VISION Act”)

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AB 937 Page 13 or work address”—was not the same information addressed by Section 1373 (“information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual”). (U.S. v. California, supra, 921 F.3d. at 891.) The information governed by Section 1373, on the other hand, is “naturally understood as a reference to a person's legal classification under federal law,” and not a reference to more general information about an individual. (Ibid.) Therefore, the court narrowly construed the meaning of Section 1373 in relation to a state law restricting the disclosure of personal information. The information that this bill seeks to prohibit public agencies from sharing with immigration officials appears to be the same informatio n that the Values Act prohibits law enforcement agencies from sharing: information about a detainee’s release date and personal information about the detainee. Given that the Value Act’s restrictions on disclosure of this information were upheld, as explained above, in U.S. v. California, supra, it would appear likely that this bill’s restrictions on information sharing would also survive an express preemption challenge because it does not conflict with Section 1373 . Furthermore, even if the bill did violate Section 1373 by prohibiting public agencies from providing ICE with “information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual,” it could still be upheld against a preemption challenge. Several federal district courts have ruled that Section 1373 itself is unlawful. As the 9th Circuit observed in footnote 19 of U.S. v. California, while citing several district court decisions, “Because we agree with the district court's conclusion, we need no t address whether [Section] 1373 is itself unlawful, though we note that various district courts have questioned its constitutionality.” (United States v. California, supra, at 893, fn. 19.) One of the district court cases mentioned in footnote 19, for example, found that Section 1373 violates the anti-commandeering principles: Section 1373 contravenes the idea that liberty is best served by the Constitution's intended division of "authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals." [Citations.] DOJ argues that Section 1373 requires states and local governments to allow the disclosure of an immigrant's address, location information, release date, date of birth, familial status, contact information, and any other information that would help fede ral immigration officials perform their duties. [Citations.] To comply with that interpretation, California and San Francisco would need to submit control of their own officials' communications to the federal government and forego passing laws contrary to Section 1373. They would also need to allocate their limited law enforcement resources to exchange information with the federal government whenever requested instead of to the essential services (like enforcing generally applicable criminal laws) they believe would most benefit their respective communities. (City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sessions (N.D.Cal. 2018) 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 950-951 [upheld in part, overruled in part by (City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sessions (N.D.Cal. 2018) 349 F. Supp. 3d 924].) Field Preemption: The Supreme Court and other federal courts have held that state laws seeking to regulate immigration on the state level--as Arizona did when it passed laws that (1) created a state-law crime for being unlawfully present in the United States; (2) created a state-law crime for working or seeking work while not authorized to do so; and (3) authorized warrantless arrests of aliens believed to be removable from the United States--are preempted by federal immigration law and its objectives. (See Arizona v. United States, supra, 567 U.S. at 416.)