Laserfiche WebLink
3. At rents or prices within the financial means of the families and <br /> individuals displaced. <br />4. In areas not generally less desirable in regard to public utilities <br /> and public and com~ericial facilities. <br />5. Reasonably accessible to their places of employment. <br /> <br /> Although the FHWA regulations implementing the URA are extensive, none <br />requires analysis of the market impact of highway displacement. Because of <br />this omission, the states have submitted--and the FttWA has accepted--reloca- <br />tion assurances which do not adequately protect low vacancy urban housing <br />markets from the effects of highway displacement. Much of the relocation <br />litigation discussed in-this Note can be attributed to inadequate supervision <br />and control by the FHWA over state relocation practices. <br /> One result of inadequate FI{WA supervision is that the states have been <br />allowed to use questionable statistical devices to expand the estimated supply <br />of available relocation housing. Highway projects are thus brought into <br />apparent conformity with the URA when, in fact, the necessary relocation units <br />do not exist. <br /> One statistical practice, for example, has been to rely on housing "turn- <br />over" as an indicator of available relocation dwellings. Turnover is the <br />percentage of housing units which are sold or which change tenants during a <br />particular year. It describes the rads at which units change occupancy, and <br />could occur in the complete absence of vacancies. HUD has prohibited the use <br />of turnover as an indicator of available relocation housing in administering <br />its own programs. Nevertheless, state highway agencies continue to employ it <br />and consequently their assurances are often unrealistic. <br /> As another method of temporarily disguising housing shortages, highway <br />displacees are sometimes given priority for public housing and put into public <br />housing ahead of those who have been on the waiting lists for many years. In <br />effect, resources allocated to public housing are diverted to compensate for <br />a highway's depletion of the housing supply. Also, many state highway agencies <br />ignore the effects of racial segregation, which limit the relocation opportuni- <br />ties of displaced minorities. In addition tO these practices which overstate <br />the apparent supply of available relocation housing, many states have also <br />minimized the demand for such housing by ignoring concurrent displacements from <br />other highways or public projects. <br /> In a loose or high vacancy housing market, these failures to accurately <br />estimate the supply and demand for relocation housing would not be alarming. <br />In this situation, the market would be elastic enough to accept the loss of <br />supply without serious consequences for the displacees or the low-income <br />housing submarket. But in urban areas--where large numbers of individuals <br />are displaced by highway construction, where many of the displacees are low- <br />income and their supply of housing is already inadequate--the relocation pay- <br />ment alone is an insufficient solution. "Satisfactory assurances" must in <br />this instance include specific guarantees that highway displacement will not <br />place uncompensated burdens on low-income displacees and on the low-income <br />housing submarket. <br /> The substantive satisfactoriness of highway relocation assurances was <br />at issue in K~i~h u. VoZp~ which concerned construction of the Century Freeway <br />in Los Angeles, expected to displace over 21,000 individuals. Although the <br />California Division of Highways had prepared relocation plans and assurances <br /> <br />III-5 <br /> <br /> <br />