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14-03a MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
<br />217 Ky 452,289 SW 1091 (error in copy-
<br />ing ordinance).
<br />Texas. Houston & Texas C. R. Co. v.
<br />Odum, 53 Tex 343 (unauthorized altera-
<br />tion of ordinance after enactment).
<br />West Virginia. Shank v. Ravens-
<br />wood, 43 w Ila 242, 27 SE 223.
<br />?Georgia. Moore v. Thomasville, 17
<br />Ga App 285, 86 SR 641; Jones v. Carroll-
<br />ton, 17 Ga App 476; 86 SE 605.
<br />8 Tennessee. Stalb v. Moore, 167
<br />Tenn 170, 67 SW2d 161.
<br />Colorado. Brophy v. Hyatt, 10 Colo
<br />223, 15 P 399.
<br />Missouri. State v. Badger, 90 Mo APP
<br />183.
<br />10 111io1s. Chicago v. Gait, 337 111
<br />547, 169 NE 731.
<br />Massachusetts. Mayo v. West
<br />Springfield, 260 Mass 594, 157 NE 700.
<br />" Oregon. McBee v. hoof Dist. No.
<br />48 ofClackamas County, 16.3 Ore 121, 96
<br />Ptd 207.
<br />12 Kentucky. l a elgre,en v. McNabb,
<br />4 SW 431, 23 Ky L. Rep 311.
<br />Mississippi. Martin v. Board o
<br />up'rs of Winston County, 131 Miss 363,
<br />17So31.
<br />i Kentucky. Citizens' Nat. Bank's
<br />Trustee v. Town of L yal 1, 262 Ky 39,88
<br />Sw2d 952; Town of lie%,il v. Hawthorne,
<br />205 Kir 426, 265 SW 937; Town of Mount
<br />Pleasant v. Rversole, 29 Ky h Rep 830, 96
<br />SW 476.
<br />Mississippi. Hall v. Franklin County,
<br />184 Miss 77, 185 So 591.
<br />14.03a. Presumptions.
<br />Although the municipal record may be incomplete in certain par-
<br />ticulars, if it appears from such record that the proceedings were
<br />regular and in substantial compliance with the charter and law,
<br />Lesumptions will b indulged in favor of its sufficient and the
<br />va rT
<br />y of the corporate acts. T , ordinarily, r elt f in rnUx TIC -
<br />pal records or minutes that an ordinance or a resolution was passed
<br />rabses a presumption in favor of the regularity of the enactment,'
<br />notwithstanding the omission of certain'orma i .ies.3 The pres ni -
<br />tion of the regularity of municipal enactments is said to arise if the
<br />record sows facts from which such a legal conclusion may be
<br />drawn. Indeed, whenever it is not affirmatively shown by the record
<br />(mere silence of the record not amounting to such a showing) that
<br />the charter provisions relative to the adoption of an ordinance have
<br />not beein complied with, the ordinance in controver y will be deemed
<br />to have been regularly adopted." Thus, where the record is silent as
<br />to the mode in which a corporate act was done, the election ofofficers
<br />for example, the presumption will be, without proof to the contraq,
<br />that they were chosen in the manner prescribed by law," So. the
<br />reading of pending hills as required by lave- will be presumed to have
<br />been done unless the record aflirmatively sows that it was not
<br />done.' It may be similarly, presumed that a record reciting that an
<br />ordinance or resolution was duly passed raises the presumption that
<br />the requisite vote was received." where a record was silent in respect
<br />t the manner in which any particular member voted, all members
<br />present and not recorded as voting otherwise, or as refusing to vote,
<br />have been presumed to have voted in the affirmative." So, where the
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