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PURCHASE AND SALE OF MOTOR FUEL BY THE CITY
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PURCHASE AND SALE OF MOTOR FUEL BY THE CITY
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1/3/2012 1:31:40 PM
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Legal Opinions
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PURCHASE AND SALE OF MOTOR FUEL BY THE CITY
Date
6/1/1973
Agency
City Attorney's Office
Notes
OPINION 73-42
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members of the city council and .containing a dec- <br />laration of the facts constituting such urgency." <br />This provision, with its stress on "urgency" is obviously <br />intended to cover the emergency situation in which the bidding <br />procedure would require too much time before the necessary action <br />could be taken. This is not precisely the situation at hand. <br />However, there is an additional exception to competitive bidding <br />requirements which is implied by law and which applies even if <br />the city's charter expresses only the emergency-type exception. <br />This is stated in Los Angeles Dredging Co. v City of Long Beach <br />(Supreme Ct, 1930) 291 P 839 as follows: <br />"It has been held that where competitive proposals <br />work an incongruity and are unavailing as affecting <br />the final result, or where they do not produce any <br />advantage... or it is practically impossible to <br />obtain what is required and observe such forms, a <br />statute requiring competitive bidding does not apply. <br />Our courts have approved this doctrine." <br />This implied exception has been reaffirmed in several <br />later cases, and it would appear that the present case would fall <br />squarely within the scope of the quoted language. However, it <br />_ must be noted that all the cases upholding this doctrine are <br />distinguishable on their facts, in that they all involve situations <br />in which there was only one possible bidder on the contract. <br />Los Angeles Dredging, supra; Hodgeman v City of San Diego (Ct. of <br />App, 1942) 128 P2d 412; Kennedy v Ross (Supreme Ct, 1946) 170 <br />P2d 904; Orange County Water District v Bennett (Ct. of App., 1958) <br />320 P2d 536; Hiller v City of Los Angeles (Ct. of App, 1961) <br />17 Cal Rptr. 579; Bisho v City of San Jose (Ct. of App., 1969) <br />76 Cal Rptr 308; County of Rivdrside v Whitlock (Ct. of App., 1972) <br />99 Cal Rptr 710. <br />'' It may also be noted that the same restrictions laid <br />down 'in Charter section 421 for a resolution authorizing contracts <br />on an emergency basis must also be followed where the authori- <br />ation is based on the implied exception. Los Angeles Dredging_, <br />supra at pp. 842-843. Thus the resolution must be passed by <br />two-thirds vote and must contain a recital of the facts justi- <br />fying the lack of competitive bidding. . <br />In the present case, if the circumstances facing the <br />City are such that the City cannot in fact obtain motor fuel <br />through its bidding procedure, then the City Council may validly <br />authorize the letting of a contract without competitive bidding. <br />Appropriate recitals, declaring the necessity, the urgency, and <br />the impossibility of using the bidding process must be included <br />in the Council's resolution. "Such a declaration, though not <br />conclusive, is prima facie evidence of the existence of an <br />emergency; and places the burden on the party attacking the <br />81 <br />
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