CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT REQUIREMENT FOR THEATER-RESTAURANT IN M1 USE DISTRICT

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_ Harlequin would face a di.ff icult task if ft attempted to sustain such a contention in court. The presumptions are heavily in favor of the validity of the zoning ordinance. It is true, as a general constitutional principal, that a statute or ordinance may not draw classifications which are arbitrary and unreasonable, ~~z?.c~` r':~at there must exist some natural, intrinsic, or constitutional d3-sti_nction between the subjects of the law which furnishes a reaso~i for the classification. Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. Piedmont (Supreme Ct, 1955) 289 P2d 438; Carlin v. Palm Springs ~(~~t of App, 1971) 92 Cal Rptr 535; Santa Barbara v. Modern Neon Sign Co. (Ct. of App., 1961) 11 Cal Rptr 57. On the other hand, the courts, in reviewing land use regulations which have been challenged as unreasonable, have consistently held that the' determination of the necessity and form of such regulations is primarily a legislative and not a judicial function. The "r.easonable basis" test supplies. If the !~~~~~~ ~~^~ty or propriety -i ~~ a clue~~tion upon which reasonable minds rr. _~,1:~ .tif fer or is f~ti+ly debateable, the legislative determination will not be dis+~urY~ed. The ca~.~rts will not inquire into the wisdom of the re~~~lation. Furthermore, if any reasons do exist which support th~~ legislative classification, the court will assume that the legislative body had them in mind when it adopted the ordinance. T,ockar_d v.__Los Anger^s _(Supreme Ct, 1949) 202 P2d 38. Snow v. _. --- ---- -- --- ------ --- _ --P. P t;!;r-den Grove (+'L of Ate 1361} 10 Cal R tr 480. Jon-Mar Co. v l;n. ',-~~..~, (~'t o~ r~pp, 1962} , Kelm v Mahoney (Ct of App, 1960) ,_. ~3 :°,.~:1 )Zpt;r 521, National Advertising v. Mont_erre (Ct of App. 1962) :"/ Cal Rptr 136, Consolidated Rock _Prods. Co. v. .Los Angeles ( ur,rerie Ct., 1962) 20 Cal Rptr 63II. In those few cases in which land use classifications have not been upheld, the court felt that the effect of the ps_oY'iibited use on the surrounding community was practically .icentical to a permitted use. Thus in the Piedmont case, supra, the roixrt struck down code section prohibiting private schools in a zcne wl~ern public schools were permitted. In the Santa Barbara case, supra, a classification between signs containing moving parts and signs which gave the appearance of movement by flashing lights was held to be improper. Likewise in the Palm Springs case, supra, an ordinance prohibiting motel-rate signs while allowing other kinds of motel signs was held invalid. In the present case, the effect of a theater-restaurant on the surrounding area is not nearly so similar to the effect of any of the unconditionally permitted uses in an M-1 zone. Significant <?ifferences exist between the effect such uses may l~:ave--_ on the planned ling-term development of the area as an industrial. z.~~ne. A thf~~~ter-restaurant of the type proposed may not: be so easily convenable to industrial uses in the future as same of the permitted uses. Some of these permitted uses may provide services which are more necessary or convenient - to have in a zone designed primarily for industrial establishments 133