ANTI-NOISE ORDINANCE; APPLICATION TO POSTAL EMPLOYEES

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unloading by hand would entail a 15 to the processing of the mail. They have employees are immune from the city's a; that a police officer who attempted to would be guilty of violating a federal ruption of the mail. 20 hour alleged nti-noisy enforce statute II THE ANTI-NOISE ORDIPIANCE delay per day in t}iat the postal ordinance and it against them prohibiting dis- The City's anti-noise ordinance (SANG Section 18-309) has two main parts to it. First, there is a general prohibition against the making of "any loud, unnecessary, or unusual noise or any noise which annoys, disturbs, injures, or endangers, the comfort, repose, health, or safety of others within the limits of the city." Second, there is a list of more specifically des- cribed noise-producing acts which are set forth as non-exclusive examples of the types of noises prohibited. by the first part and which are expressly prohibited. One of the examples of this second part is paragraph (9) prohibiting the "creation of loud and excessive noise in connection with loading or unloading any vehicle." The first part of the ordinance by itself - the general anti-noise prohibition - is rather poorly worded. It should be made expressly subject to a standard of unreasonableness or exces- siveness within the circumstances in which it occurs. Also, the use of the conjunctive "and" rather than the disjunctive "or" would have been more appropriate. As the clause now reads, it prohibits noises which the city has no legitimate purpose in prohibiting pursuant to the interest of preserving the public tranquility - e.g., noise which is unnecessary but neither loud nor disturbing and not unreasonable in the circumstances. In view of this poor wording, it is doubtful that a conviction could be sustained on the general prohibition alone without .any showing of any violation of any of the more specific. prohibitions contained in the second part of the ordinance. It is possible, however, that a court would read a legislative in- tent into the general prohibition which does limit its effect to noises which are unreasonable or excessive in the circumstances. With respect to the more specific prohibitions contained in the second part of the ordinance, each paragraph appears to be rationally related to the public purpose of_ preserving the public peace and tranquility. Many of them use terms such as "annoying," "disturbing," "loud," "excessive," or "unreasonable" which are somewhat indefinite concepts. Paragraph (9), for example, prohibits "excessive" noise. Such terms may be necessary in order to rationally relate the specific prohibitions to the legitimate public purpose behind the ordinance, but they do ren- der the provisions open to the due process argument that they are too vague and indefinite to supply an ascertainable standard of guilt. -83-