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JULY 1, 2018 - OIS2018.0001 - SAPD 2018-15953
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6 <br /> <br />Thus, in Tennessee v. Garner (1985) 471 U.S. 1, 3, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a police officer is entitled <br />to use deadly force only when “the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of <br />death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” <br /> <br />This limitation was, however, clarified subsequently by the High Court in the seminal case of Graham v. Connor (1989) <br />490 U.S. 386, wherein the Supreme Court explained that an officer’s right to use force [i.e., his/her weapon] is to be <br />analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard. The Supreme Court further stated that <br />the determination of the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force “must embody allowance for the fact that police <br />officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly <br />evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” (Id. at 396-397.) <br /> <br />The United States Supreme Court’s analysis and teachings in Graham appear applicable to the circumstances <br />surrounding the interactions of SAPD Officer Roelof with Taylor. <br /> <br />LEGAL ANALYSIS <br />The issue in this case is whether the conduct of Officer Roelofs on July 1, 2018, was criminally culpable and without <br />justification. As stated above, in order to charge Officer Roelofs with a criminal violation, it is required that the prosecution <br />be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no legal justification existed for the police officer’s conduct. Therefore, <br />in order to lawfully charge Officer Roelofs with a crime, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he <br />did not act in lawful self-defense or defense of others. <br /> <br />As the Court of Appeal held in the Brown case, it is well settled that “unlike private citizens, police officers act under color <br />of law to protect the public interest. They are charged with acting affirmatively and using force as part of their duties, <br />because ‘the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of <br />physical coercion or threat thereof to effectuate it.’ Police officers are, in short, not similarly situated to the ordinary battery <br />defendant and need not be treated the same. In these cases, then, the [ ] police officer is in the exercise of the privilege <br />of protecting the public peace and order and he is entitled to the even greater use of force than might be in the same <br />circumstances required for self-defense.” (Brown v. Ransweiler (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 527.) <br /> <br />Where potential dangerous, emergency conditions or other exigent circumstances exist, the California Court of Appeal <br />have noted that the United States Supreme Court’s definition of reasonableness is comparatively generous to the police. <br />The court in Brown noted that in effect, “the Supreme Court intends to surround the police who make these on-the-spot <br />choices in dangerous situations with a fairly wide zone of protection in close cases. A police officer's use of deadly force <br />is reasonable if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious <br />physical injury to the officer or others. Thus, an officer may reasonably use deadly force when he or she confronts an <br />armed suspect in close proximity whose actions indicate an intent to attack.” (Brown v. Ransweiler, supra, 171 <br />Cal.App.4th at p. 528.) <br /> <br />Based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Roelofs could have reasonably believed Taylor posed a significant <br />threat of death or serious physical injury to himself and others at the moment he fired his handgun. This conclusion is <br />based on the totality of the circumstances, but mainly based on the conduct of Taylor in the moments leading up to the <br />shooting. Officer Roelofs was dispatched to reports of a suspicious male in the parking garage, who was carrying metal <br />objects in both hands, and appeared to be attempting to break into the locked vehicles in the garage. Upon arrival to the <br />parking garage, Officer Roelofs encountered Taylor, who was carrying a metal object in one hand and a strip of metal in <br />the other. As Officer Roelofs exited his patrol car, Taylor began advancing toward the back of the patrol car, with both <br />metal objects in his hands. This confirmed the veracity of the initial report to the police. Officer Roelofs yelled at Taylor <br />numerous times to drop the pipe, but Taylor kept moving towards the rear of the patrol car, with the metal bars raised. <br />This clearly presents a very dangerous and potentially violent situation. <br /> <br />Taylor stopped walking at the rear of the patrol car, positioning himself with his left side facing Officer Roelofs. Taylor, in <br />a position similar to a baseball batter’s stance, began to swing the metal bars. Officer Roelofs gave multiple orders to
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