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2012-007 SA
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8/29/2012 2:59:59 PM
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City Clerk
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Resolution
Doc #
2012-007 SA
Date
8/20/2012
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Page 3 of 5 <br />For instance, in Ersa Grae Corp. v. Fluor Corp., (1991) 1 Cal.AppAth 613, 623, Division 1 <br />of the Second District Court of Appeal (Los Angeles) found the terms of large scale real estate <br />development contract sufficiently definite to enforce where the contract stated one party, Ersa Grae, <br />agreed to provide funding within a defined period after the satisfaction of certain conditions; the <br />other, Fluor, agreed to select and pay for the services of all third-parties needed to supervise and <br />carry out the necessary construction work; and, upon completion, Fluor agreed to transfer its interests <br />in the completed project and underlying land lease to a consortium in exchange for £1 million.8 In <br />rejecting Fluor's claim that the contract was unenforceable because it contemplated the parties' <br />negotiation and execution of future agreements necessary to carry out their intent (e.g., the parties' <br />required negotiation and execution of their contemplated future agreement to convey the fully <br />developed property subject to a long-term land lease),9 Ersa Grae explained: <br />The fact that an agreement contemplates subsequent documentation does not <br />invalidate the agreement if the parties have agreed to its existing terms. (See Clark v. <br />Fiedler (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 838, 847 ["`Any other rule would always permit a <br />party who has entered a contract like this ... to violate it, whenever the understanding <br />was that it should be reduced to another written form, by simply suggesting other and <br />additional terms and conditions. If this were the rule the contract would never be <br />completed in cases where, by changes in the market, or other events occurring <br />subsequent to the written negotiations, it became the interest of either party to adopt <br />that course in order to escape or evade obligations incurred in the ordinary course of <br />commercial business."']. See also, Smissaert v. Chiado (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 827, <br />830.0 <br />The legally enforceable contract in Ersa Grae is very similar to the S.A. Venture Agreement. <br />Here, the Former Agency agreed to pay certain Fees in connection with certain types o future <br />development performed by the Developer at the Site. <br />Ersa Grae is just one of dozens of published cases holding contracts of this type fully <br />enforceable. See, e.g., Bleeeher v. Conte (1981) 29 Ca1.3d 345, 354-55 [the law does not bar specific <br />performance of a land sales contract in which a city's future approval of certain development plans is <br />made a condition precedent to completion of the agreement]; Larwin-Southern California, Inc. v. <br />JGB Investment Co. (1979) 101 Ca1.App.3d 626, 638 [the mere presence of a satisfaction clause in a <br />contract does not result in that contract's nullity]; Mattei v, Hopper (1958) 51 Cal.2d 119 [land sale <br />contracts containing satisfaction clauses are generally enforceable, except where such clauses render <br />a party's obligation to perform illusory]. Here, DOF does not advance the unsustainable claim that <br />anything in the S.A. Venture Agreement renders either party's duty to perform illusory. <br />Black letter law further holds that "[a] contract's material terms (such as subject matter, <br />price, payment terms, and duration) must be `sufficiently definite' so that each party can be <br />Moreover, "[c]onsideration may be an act, forbearance, change in legal relations, or a promise." 1 Witkin, Summary <br />of California Law (10th ed. 2005) CONTRACTS, § 202. <br />e Judicial Council of California Advisory Committee on Civil Jury Instructions 302, Contract Formation - Essential <br />Factual Elements. <br />7 See, e.g., Patel v. Lieberrnensch (2008) 45 Cal .4th 344, 369-70 (quoting and citing Mclllrnoil v. Frawley Motor <br />Co. (1923) 190 Cal. 546). <br />s 39 (1991) 1 Cal.AppAth 613, 623. <br />9 Ersa Grae Corp., 1 Cal.AppAth at 623. <br />10 Id. at n. 3 (citations in original). <br />SA Resolution No. 2012-007 <br />Page 17 of 24
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