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HomeMy WebLinkAboutNS-1391MJK:nr 9-23-77 ORDINANCE NO. NS-1391 AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF SANTA ANA ADDING SECTION 1-19 TO THE SANTA ANA MUNICIPAL CODE, PERTAINING TO TIME LIMITATION FOR SEEKING REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SANTA ANA DOES ORDAIN AS FOLLOWS: SECTION 1: That the Santa Ana Municipal Code, is hereby amended by adding a section, to be numbered 1-19, which said section reads as follows: Sec. 1-19. Time Limit for Seeking Review of Administrative Determinations. The provisions of Section 1094.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of California are incorporated herein as if fully set forth and are made applicable to any party seeking judicial review of any decision of the City of Santa Ana or of any commission, board, officer, or agent thereof. No action for declaratory relief may be brought to review an administrative decision of the City of Santa Ana or of any commission, board, officer, or agent thereof. SECTION 2: If any section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase or portion of this ordinance is for any reason held to be invalid or unconstitutional by the decision of any court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this ordinance. The City Council of the City of Santa Ana hereby declares that it would have adopted this ordinance and each section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase or portion thereof irrespective of the fact that any one or more sections, subsections, sentences, clauses, phrases or portions be declared invalid or unconstitu- tional. ADOPTED, this by the following vote: AYES: NOES: 21st day of November , 1977, COUNCILMEN: Ward, Bricken, 0rtiz, £vans, Garthe, Brandt COUNCILMEN: None Yamamoto, ATTEST: ABSENT: COUNCILMEN: None MAYOR CLERK OF THE COUNCIL APPROVED AS TO FORM: KEITH L. GOW, CITY ATTORNEY CODE OF CIVII~ PROCEDURE provided for by WP. If. & Inst. Code. § 10962, in ~ to enable a needy pev~n to establish ush judicial proceed·ap hi~ or her risht to · ted by Welf. & Inst. Code, § 10962, mmninfl. 74. In GeneeM produced in the exercise of reasonable diliglmce. unless relevant evidence wn~ improperly excluded v Division of Industrial Safety (1975) 13 C3d ~ ~n$ referred 1o in the charges ever saw the c I,, ·f)d admitted writing all of the preecrip- ti,.,,,i. Pest.cci v Board of Medical Examin~x (1975) 45 CArd 83, Il? Cai Rptr ~. ~ln Specific Instnoem cODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ing an application to ·pprpprmte water, the trial co·rs incorrectly held that aub~tantial evidence supported the board's impo~tion of a condition that the applicant permit public access to its ~ecreational reservoir~ where the reason for the condition was that the approved dive,sion of water from a river would reduce its flow, which would have an uncertain effect on the "fishery." and that it would result in '*diminished recrcational value" of the river, where the record showed that the fish~ demi·ds of the river were adequately met by conditions to the diversion IBreod to hatween the applicant and the State Dep~rtmem of Fish and Game, and adopted in suhatance by the ~rd, where, though there were clear inferences that the water level of the river would he lower at certoin times, the~e was no evlde~.e as to the eff~t of such decre~ in terms of pre~nt or pro~pcetive ret:reational use, and where it was not established that Io~ to the public from projected annual evaporation of water from the project equalled the Io~ to he suffered by the applic~ot through impo- sition of the condition. Bank of America v State Water ge~our~es Control Board (19'/4) 42 CA3d 198, 116 Cai gptr ??0. in a mandate proceeding to rev~e~ · deci~.on of the State Water Resource~ Control Board approv- ing an application to appropriate water, the record of the administrative prOC--~~--~ng did not support the trial court's ruling that "estoppel and waiver" barred the applicant's challenge to n condition imposed by the hoard that the applicant permit public ~__¢_~._ to its recreational re~'~ire, where., though one of the applicant's witp~_~'~ had stated that there would ha public accel, he finally concluded zhot the quettim~ of such _~-~t had "not yet been determined," and where the hoard'e order amc·dine decision noted that the record was conflicting as to the applicant's intent with regard to public ac.~ss. Bank of America v State Water gesource~ ~ontrol Boord (1974) 42 CA3d 198, 116 Cai Rptr 770. ~. --Employees' Rights A judgment denying · writ of mandate to · § 1094.6 former ~ity policeman who chellenfled the city council's denial of his application for reinststemeot and back pay had to he reversed, where the council had made no flndin~s, formal or informal. where it~ action could have been on any one of ~everai blse~ and where some of the ha~s tug- geared by the evidence would not support that ~etion; thus, remand to the city wa~ required for another hearins followed by appropriate finding. Hadley v Ontario (1974) 43 CA3d 121, 117 Cai Rptr 513. ~. In Gram'al A jud~meor in an administrative mandate pro- ceedine upholding the discharge of a police ol~cer for lying to departmental investigatorx, required ~vet~] where the trial court applied the substan- tial evidence ~tandard of review approved by cur- rent decisional law, but where, while an appeal of the judgment was pendinfl, the Supreme Court rendered · decision holding that an order or decision of an agency substantially affecting a fundamental vested right is to be revic~ed by the trial court exercising its independent judgment on the evidence, which ruic was specifically made applicable to all pending appeals. Furthermore, the appellate court could not conduct the de novo review in place of the trial court, in the interest of expediency, since it did not have the nme power se the t~ai court in ~evicwing the administrative p_r,~',.--d!ng, but was limited to determining whether substantial evidence supported the trial court's Sndinp. Br~h v ~ Angeles (1975) 45 CArd 120, 119 Cai Rptr 366. ~/. Hnrmlem and Revml~le ~'ror In mandamus proe~edings involving the review of a municipality's board of pension commi~ion- erx' denial of · policeman's application for a di~bility retirement pension, it was rever~ibic e.eror for the trial court to apply the substantial evidence test, rather than making an independent evaluation of the evidence. Craxer v Los Angeic~ (1974) 42 CA3d 76, 117 Cai Rptr 534. § 1094.6. [Time limit for seeking review of administrative determinations: Preparation of record: Application in local agency] (al Judicial review of any decision of a local agency, other than school district, as the term local agency is defined in Section 54951 of the Government Code, or of any commission, board, officer or agent thereof, may be had pursuant to Section 1094.5 of this code only if the petition for writ of mandate pursuant to such section is filed within the time limits specified in this section. (b) Any such petition shall be filed not later than the 90th day following the date on which the decision becomes final. If there is no provision for reconsideration of the decision in any applicable provision of any statute, charter, or rule, for thc purposes of this section, the decision is final on the § 1094.6 CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE date it is made. If there is such provision for reconsideration, the decision is final for the purposes of this section upon the expiration of the period during which such reconsideration can be sought; provided, that if reconsid- eration is sought pursuant to any such provision the decision is final for the purposes of this section on the date that reconsideration is rejected. (c) The complete record of the proceedings shall be prepared by the local agency or its commission, board, officer, or agent which made the decision and shall be delivered to the petitioner within 90 days after he has filed a written request therefor. The local agency may recover from the petitioner its actual costs for transcribing or otherwise preparing the record. Such record shall include the transcript of the proceedings, ali pleadings, all notices and. orders, any proposed decision by a hearing officer, the final decision, all admitted exhibits, all rejected exhibits in the possession of the local agency or its commission, board, officer, or agent, ali written evidence, and any other papers in the case. (d) If the petitioner files a request for the record as specified in subdivision (c) within 10 days after the date the decision becomes final as provided in subdivision Co), the time within which a petition pursuant to Section 1094.5 may be filed shall be extended to not later than the 30th day following the date on which the record is either personally delivered or mailed to the petitioner or his attorney of record, if he has one. (e) As used in this section, decision means adjudicatory administrative decision made, after hearing, suspending, demoting, or dismissing an officer or employee, revoking or denying an application for a permit or a license, or denying an application for any retirement benefit or allowance. (f) In making a final decision as defined in subdivision (e), the local agency shall provide notice to the party that the time within which judicial review must be sought is governed by this section. As used in this subdivision, "party" means an officer or employee who has been suspended, demoted or dismissed; a person whose permit or license has been revoked or whose application for a permit or license has been denied; or a person whose application for a retirement benefit or allowance has been denied. (g) This section shall be applicable in a local agency only if the governing board thereof adopts an ordinance or resolution making this section applica- ble. If such ordinance or resolution is adopted, the provisions of this section shall prevail over any conflicting provision in any otherwise applicable law relating to the subject matter. Added Stat~ 1976 ch 276 § I. § 1095. [Award of damages: Recovery from public entity] L In General The ienerai provisions of Code Civ. Proc., § 1095, aliovAnl d~mage~ in mandamus actions, we~ no~ intended to prevail over the speci~,~ immuniti~ ~-anted to publi~ entities and pub[~ employees by Gov. Code, §9 818.4, 821.2. State v Superioe Court (1974) 12 C3d 23'/, I15 Cai Rptr 497, 524 P2d 1281. ~0 2. Dama~ The provisions of the Tort Claims Act, ~rnntin~ immunily to pubii~ entities and empioyee~ foe discretionary acts in general (Oov. Code, 9§ 820.2, 815.2, subd. Co)), ~nd fo~ lioemifll ~ctivit~ in pafliculu (Oov. Code, 9§ 821.2, 818.4,) take pr~o. edenoe ove~ II~ provisiom of Code Civ. Pro~., § 1095. providinl that if · pc·ilmne~ in a mandy- CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE mtm ~ctinn recovm judlment, he my ai~o corm' dam~m alain~t the public entity repre. ~ted by th· olTIcm' a~nst whom the action il ~wouShL O*Hllln v Bo~'d of Zonins Adju~tmem (1974) 38 CAM 722, 113 Cai Rptr ~01. Und~ Code Civ. Proc., § 109~, sove~nins re- § 1096. Service of the writ 2 Cai Jut 3d Administrative Law § 32~.