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AB 937
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<br />A state or local agency shall not arrest or assist with the arrest, confinement, detention,
<br />transfer, interrogation, or deportation of an individual for an immigration enforcement
<br />purpose in any manner, including but not limited to, by notifying another agency or
<br />subcontractor thereof regarding the release date and time of an individua l, releasing or
<br />transferring an individual into the custody of another a gency or subcontractor thereof, or
<br />disclosing personal information . . . about an individual, including, but not limited to, an
<br />individual’s date of birth, work address, home address, or parole or probation check in date
<br />and time to another agency or subcontractor thereof. This subdivision shall apply
<br />notwithstanding any contrary provisions in Section 7282.5, subparagraphs (C) and (D) of
<br />paragraph (1) of, or paragraph (4) of, subdivisio n (a) of Section 7284.6, or subdivision (b) of
<br />7284.6.
<br />Although this bill prohibits the same information from being shared with immigration authorities
<br />that the Values Act prohibited from being shared with them (and the 9th Circuit ruled could be
<br />withheld from immigration authorities under the Values Act), it differs from the Values Act in
<br />several significant ways. First, it provides that, “This subdivision shall apply notwithstanding
<br />any contrary provisions ” in the Values Act. This apparently means that the exceptions listed in
<br />the Values Act that allow law enforcement agencies to provide information to immigration
<br />authorities in specified circumstances (i.e. when law enforcement officials are cooperating with
<br />federal immigration authorities in the apprehension of individuals who have been convicted of
<br />serious and violent felonies, sex offenses, child molestation, and child abuse; when it is available
<br />to the public, and when it is “in response to a notification request from immigration authorities ”)
<br />those exceptions would not apply under the bill.
<br />These particular limits on information sharing may not result in conflict preemption, though,
<br />because they do not necessarily make it impossible for public officials to comply with both
<br />federal law, or “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
<br />and objectives of Congress.” (Arizona v. United States, supra, 567 U.S. at 399.) While the bill’s
<br />information sharing provision is more restrictive that the Values Act, the bill does not
<br />specifically prohibit the disclosure of information about a person’s immigration status . Given
<br />that the meaning of Section 1373 has been narrowly construed, the bill’s greater restriction on
<br />the release of information likely would not violate Section 1373 or result in conflict preemption.
<br />The second significant reason why this bill is more restrictive than the Values Act is that , unlike
<br />the Values Act, it does not specifically and expressly permit the sharing of information regarding
<br />a person’s citizenship or immigration status, which was at least mentioned by the 9th Circuit
<br />when it upheld the Values Act. (See U.S. v. California, supra, 921 F.3d at 890.) Therefore, it is
<br />conceivable (though unlikely) that the 9th Circuit could reach a different conclusion about this
<br />bill’s limitations on information sharing than it made regarding the Values Act because of the
<br />bill’s law of express permission.
<br />Third, and most significant, is the fact that the bill’s language restricting the ability of state and
<br />local agencies to assist with immigration enforcement efforts is extremely broad. The bill
<br />provides that a public agency cannot “assist with the arrest, confinement, detention, transfer,
<br />interrogation, or deportation of an individual for an immigration enforcement purpose in any
<br />manner.” This logically could be interpreted to prohibit an agency from sending to ICE, or
<br />receiving from ICE information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or
<br />unlawful, of any individual in direct violation of Section 1373. Alternatively, this provision
<br />could be interpreted to “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
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