Item 21 - Assembly Bill 937 (the “VISION Act”)

Home Browse Search

AB 937 Page 16 purposes and objectives of Congress.” (Arizona v. United States, supra, 567 U.S. at 399.). If so, this provision could raise a conflict preemption concern about the bill. Author’s amendments. In order to address the possible, but remote, concern that some aspects of the bill could raise conflict preemption concerns, the author proposes to make two clarifying amendments. First, the author intends to amend the bill to add the following additional intent language, clarifying that it is the intent of the bill to be consistent with federal law: (f) No federal statutes affirmatively require local or state governments to assist ICE with immigration enforcement. While one federal statute specifically addresses this issue, 8 U.S.C. § 1373, it only passively restricts local and state governments from prohibiting the sharing of only information related to immigration status or citizenship. Further, 8 U.S.C. § 1373 has been found by several federal courts to be unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Tenth Amendment prohibits the federal government from affirmatively compelling a state to enact laws and policies, and also prevents the federal government from prohibiting a state or local jurisdiction from enacting new laws or policies. See Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n , 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1477 (2018). Applying this rule from the U.S. Supreme Court, a number of federal district courts have held that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 is unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged this fact when it upheld the Values Act against a preemption challenge in US v. California (9th Cir. 2019) 921 F.3d 865, cert. denied, US v. California (2020) 141 S.Ct. 124. It is the intent of the VISION Act to be consistent with federal law. Second, the author proposes to add a severability clause to the bill so that in the event that any portion of the bill should be invalidated, other portions of the bill would remain in effect. This bill imposes civil liability on public agencies and employees for viol ating its provisions. The general rule in California is that a government entity (or an employee acting within scope of employment) is immune from liability unless there is a statute providing otherwise. (See Government Code Section 815.) Under the Government Claims Act, “Except as provided by statute, . . [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Section 815 (a).) Therefore, sovereign immunity is the rule and governmental liability is limited to exceptions specifically set forth by statute. (Zuniga v. Housing Auth. (1995) 41 Cal. App. 4th 82.) The Government Claims Act itself sets out exceptions to the general rule of immunity. For example, Section 835 provides that a government entity is liable for injury caused by the dangerous condition on government property. Section 862, which is also within the Government Claims Act, makes government entities liable for injuries caused by pesticide use to the same extent as a private person. Also, as a general rule, a public entity is liable for an injury caused by an act or omission of its employees who are acting within the scope of their employment, if the act would have given rise to a cause of action against that employee. (Section 815.2.) This bill would create such a statute by providing for governmental liability. Specifically, the bill provides that in addition to any other sanctions, penalties, or remedies provided by law, a person may bring an action for “equitable or declaratory relief” in a court of competent jurisdiction against a state or local agency or state or local official that violates the bill’s provision. It further provides that a state or local agency or official that violates this section is liable for actual and general damages, and reasonable attorney’s fees, which normally would be paid by each party and would not be subject to recovery by the prevailing party.