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?lection" and "special election", and does not make provisions or give <br /> a definition of "regular election". Political Code, Section 1041, de- <br /> fines a "general election" as follows: "There must be held throughout <br /> the state, on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November, in <br /> the year eighteen hundred and eighty, and in every second year thereaf- <br /> ter, an election, to be known as the general election." <br /> And gives the definition of "special election" as follows: <br /> "Special elections are such as are held to supply vacancies in any <br /> office, and are held at such times as may be designated by the proper <br /> board or officer." <br /> However, our Supreme Court has had occasion in the case of <br /> People vs. Lynch, 114 California Reports, at Page 168, to cite several <br /> authorities from out of state cases, defining the term "regular election <br /> A Kansas case is cited and quoted as follows: "The words, 'regular <br /> election' do not necessarily mean general election or township election, <br /> or any state, county city or district election. They simply mean the <br /> regular election prescribed by law for the election of the particular <br /> officer to be elected." <br /> In citing a Florida case, the following quotation is given; <br /> "When it is declared that the city council shall fill vacancies until <br /> the next regular election, it means until the next regular election pro- <br /> vided by the charter for electing the officer whose term has been vacant <br /> The nearest case we have in California which might decide this <br /> question as to the meaning of the term "regular election" is found in <br /> the case of People vs. Babcock, in 123 California Reports, at page 307, <br /> in which our Supreme Court construed the term "regular election" under <br /> an Act of the City and County of San Francisco referring to the appoint- <br /> merit of the Superintendant of Schools by the Board of Education to fill <br /> a vacancy. In filling this vacancy, the Board of Education specified, <br /> "to fill the vacancy until the regular election then next following." <br /> In this particular case the next regular election was a general <br /> state election and also a general municipal election, and the proclama- <br /> tion for the municipal election included the office of superintendant of <br /> schools. In affirming this election for superintendant of schools and <br /> in their opinion, the Supreme Court states: "In the case of any parti- <br /> cular statute the construction can be determined Only by considering <br /> the context in which the word is found, the purpose of the statute and <br /> the object which it was designed to accomplish. The next regular elec- <br /> tion may mean the election at which officers are to be regularly elected <br /> or "regular" may be used merely to exclude special elections, or it may <br /> be used synonimously or inter-changeably with the word "general". <br /> They further make a quotation of the particular section under <br /> discussion and state as follows: "If regular election is here to be <br />construed as the election at which this class of officers is regularly <br />- chosen~ then in cases of some officers contemplated by the cDmrter, the <br /> regular election could only be at the end of the term and the provision <br /> that a person shall be elected to serve for the remainder of the unex- <br /> pired term would be meaningless. These instances are given not as hav- <br /> ing any dstemzinative force upon the question here presented, but in <br /> illustration of the fact that the p~hrase 'regular election' has no <br /> fixed and inflexible meaning." <br /> This decision was rendered in 1899, at which time general <br /> municipal elections for members of the Board of Trustees were held <br /> every two years. In other words, the terms were staggered~ Section <br /> 754.of tD~ Act at this time could not be mis-interpreted and the inten- <br /> tion of the Legislature was clear by reason of the fact that a general <br /> municipal election was held ~very two years. In.1903, Section 752 of <br /> the Act was amended so that after 1907, the staggered system was abol- <br /> ished and we now have the Board of Trustees all elected every four years <br /> Therefore, the force and effect of Section 754 was taken away and an <br /> app~ntee would hold office until the next general municipal election. <br /> This in view of the fact that Section 752 then specified and now speci- <br /> fys that the Board of Trustees shall be elected at a GENERAL MUNICIPAL <br /> ELECTION. <br /> The o~ly construction, therefore, that can now be placed upon <br /> Section 784 as t~ the term "regular election" is that it means the next <br /> general municipal election as it meant previous to the amendment. <br /> The Supreme Court in conclusion of their opinion in the case <br /> of People vs. Babcock, state as follows: "'Regular election, as thus <br /> employed, then, is synonimous with 'general election'. Whether it be a <br /> general state election or a general municipal election~ it is unneces- <br /> sary here to determine, since the election at which the relator was <br /> elected was both a general State election and a general municipal <br /> election". <br /> From the foregoing decisions, the writer has come to the con- <br /> clusion that "regular election" as used in Section 754 of Act 8233 can <br /> only be given the meaning intended by the Legislature at the time the <br /> Act was passed, and means the next general municipal election occuring <br /> in April, 1938. <br /> <br />Yours very truly, <br /> <br />(Signed) 0. A. Jacobs <br /> <br />On motion of Trustee Penn, seconded by Bruns and carried, the City <br /> <br /> Council adJourned. <br /> <br />APPROVED: <br /> <br />l~or of t~e City 6f Santa Aha. <br /> <br />City ~le~k. <br /> <br /> <br />