URS CORPORATION 4 - 2005 - Laserfiche WebLink

Home Browse Search

Vulnerability Assessment (Part 2 of the Risk Assessment) The vulnerability assessment will identify and rank potential targets in the UAs. URS will review the list of over 65 high-risk targets identified in the 2004 plan and based on our familiarity with the County, we will assess if any obvious targets are missing. If Caltrans, Southern California Edison and the Southern California Gas Company were not included in the identification of the initial target list. we will work with law enforcement representatives in the UA's to obtain target information from these entities. When documenting the basic vulnerability assessment for each target, the following will be inciuded: Levei of visibility, Criticality of the target site to the UA. Impact outside the UA. PTE access to the target, Potentiai target threat of the hazard, Potential target site population capacity, and Potential collaterai mass casualties. Additionally. when developing the site-specific vulnerability assessment. we will identity specific vulnerabilities unique to the potential target and provide general recommendations for reducing potential vulnerabilities. URS will use a tiered approach to ranking the targets. As the complete list of potential targets is compiled, all potential targets will be entered into an Access database that URS has specifically developed for UASI target ranking. We will first conduct a screening-level ranking of all of the potential targets using the ODP Assessment model. This will provide an inexpensive preliminary screening-Ievei ranking of the targets and includes the elements of the basic vulnerability assessment specified in the RFP (i.e. level of visibility. criticality of the target, impact outside the UA, etc.). The results of this screening level analysis will be presented to the UA steering committee for consensus. The use of a simple Access database will allow an "on-the-f1y" look at what-if scenarios related to changing scores for various elements for specific sites during the steering committee meeting. This ability was instrumental in facilitating consensus to the target ranking in the San Diego UASI vulnerability assessment. Interviews will also be conducted with the stakeholders in the consensus-building process. If the top ten infrastructure targets do not emerge in the preliminary screening-level. a secondary screening-level analysis will be conducted for up to 15 targets in each UA using the Carver model. The Carver model is similar to the ODP Assessment model, but it provides a higher level of specificity for a number of the vulnerability elements. It should be noted that any facility in the County that has developed a Buffer Zone Protection Plan (BZPP) will already have a Carver model analysis and the 15 sites selected will supplement the BZPP sites. Results of this modeling will also be presented to the UA steering committee for discussion and consensus. and the top 10 infrastructure sites in each UA will be identified. Additionally for the top 10 targets. we propose to conduct a more detailed level analysis using the Homeland Security Comprehensive Assessment Model (HLS-CAM). HLS-CAM was developed by the National Domestic Preparedness Coalition Inc. (NDPCI). NDPCI is a non-profit. public I private partnership, whose leadership includes the West Virginia National Guard, the West Virginia University School of Medicine, and the Sheriff's Office. Orange County. Florida. The model was derived from a collection of sources including U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Manual: The CIA Fact-book; U.S. Army FM100-37; U.S Army TC19-16; U.S. Army FM34-130; Training Guidance to West Virginia National Guard from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); Page 10 of 51