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<br />~,'''t. <br />-~~ <br />~'--Y,d"C~"Un,.,;) <br />, . ' . <br />- - <br /> <br />COMBINED AREAS STRA TEGle PLAN <br />FOR TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS <br /> <br />Vulnerability Asses..ment <br />The vulnerability assessment will identify and rank potential targets in the UAs. URS will review the list of over <br />65 high-risk targets identified in the 2004 plan and based on our familiarity with the County, we will assess if <br />any obvious targets are missing. If Caltrans, Southern California Edison and the Southern California Gas <br />Company were not included in the identification of the initial target list. we will work with law enforcement <br />representatives in the UAs to obtain target information from these entities. <br /> <br />We propose a tiered approach to ranking the targets. As the complete list of potential targets is compiled. all <br />potential targets will be entered into an Access database lhat URS has specifically developed for UASI target <br />ranking. We will first conduct a screening-level ranking of all of the potential targets using the ODP Assessment <br />model. This will provide an inexpensive preliminary screening-level ranking of the targets and includes the <br />elements of the basic vulnerability assessment specified in the RFP (i.e. level of visibility, criticality of the target. <br />impact outside the UA, etc.). The results of this screening level analysis will be presented to the UA steering <br />committee for consensus. The use of a simple Access database will allow an "on-the-fly" look at what-if <br />scenarios related to changing scores for various elements for specific sites during the steering committee <br />meeting. This ability was instrumental in facilitating consensus to the target ranking in the San Diego UASI <br />vulnerability assessment. Interviews will also be conducted with the stakeholders in the consensus-building <br />process. <br /> <br />If the top ten infrastructure targets do not emerge in the preliminary screening-level, a secondary screening- <br />level analysis will be conducted for up to 15 targets in each UA using the Carver model. The Carver model is <br />similar to the ODP Assessment model, but it provides a higher level of specificity for a number of the <br />vulnerability elements. It should be noted that any facility in the County that has developed a Buffer Zone <br />Protection Plan (BZPP) will already have a Carver model analysis and the 15 sites selected will supplement the <br />BZPP sites. Results of this modeling will also be presented to the UA steering committee for discussion and <br />consensus. and the top 10 infraslructure sites in each UA will be identified. <br /> <br />If an additional level of characterization is desired for the top 10 targets, we propose an option to conduct a <br />more detailed level analysis using the Homeland Security Comprehensive Assessment Model (HLS-CAM). HLS- <br />CAM was developed by the National Domestic Preparedness Coalition Inc. (NDPCI). NDPCI is a non-profit, <br />public I private partnership, whose leadership includes the West Virginia National Guard, the West Virginia <br />University School of Medicine, and the Sheriffs Office, Orange County. Florida. The model was derived from a <br />collection of sources including U.s. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Manual; The CIA Fact- <br />book; u.s. Army FM100-37; U.s Army TC19-16; U.s. Army FM34-130; Training Guidance to West Virginia <br />National Guard from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA): Orange County Sheriffs Office, Orlando, <br />FL; Florida Regional Domestic Security Taskforce Risk Assessment Model; ASIS International; and other open <br />source documents. This model is becoming commonly used for target vulnerability assessment <br /> <br />Finally, if extensive and very specific vulnerability information is desired for each target, URS will develop a cost <br />estimate to include an analysis using the RiskWatch@ model. RiskWatch@ was developed as a software tool <br />based on the extensive site-specific vulnerability assessment guidance in FEMA Reference Manual to Mitigate <br />Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (FEMA 426. December 2003). As shown in the brochure (included <br /> <br />URS <br /> <br /> <br />8 <br />